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Although EUNATO institutional relations have been evolving since the Saint-
Malo Declaration in 1998, efficient and coherent cooperation is still lacking. This
article goes beyond the narrative of blockage caused purely at the political level in
order to illustrate both formal and informal EUNATO cooperation at both the
centre (Brussels) and on the ground (missions). This article addresses cooperation
in terms of the actors involved at three different levels: state actors, international
staff, and military personnel. Although, much has been done to advance
cooperation between international staffers in Brussels and between those on the
ground in common mission areas, the lack of a political agreement  one that
moves beyond the limited scope of Berlin Plus  is causing severe fatigue, most
notably at the level of international staff. Furthermore, the informal and ad hoc
cooperation that has been the underlying facilitator of synergy between the two
organisations could start to atrophy if a grand or intermediary bargain is not
achieved in the near future.1
Keywords: security studies; international relations; institutionalism
Introduction
The EU and NATO have had formal institutional relations since 1999.2 However, an
informal relationship between the two organisations has existed dating back to at
least 1996 and it could be argued for even longer. Today, official texts and
communique´s speak of a relationship whereby the ‘two organisations share common
strategic interests and cooperate in a spirit of complementarity and partnership’3 or
that ‘the EU and NATO have built a genuine strategic partnership that is now well
established and deep-rooted’.4 However, when ones speaks to staff working inside
both of these organisations, a more accurate description of the relationship can be
depicted as ‘institutional fatigue’,5 ‘abnormal’,6 and ‘very bad’.7
In fact, the political disagreements that have caused institutional deadlock have
been well documented.8 This article seeks to go beyond this narrative of blockage
caused purely at the political level in order to illustrate the true nature of both formal
and informal EUNATO cooperation at both the centre (Brussels) and on the
ground (missions). In doing so, this article also addresses cooperation in terms of the
actors involved at three different levels: state actors, international staff, and military
personnel. This article argues that although much has been done to advance
cooperation between both the civilian and military international staff in both
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institutions and on the ground in common mission areas, the lack of a political
agreement  one that moves beyond the limited scope of Berlin Plus  is causing
severe fatigue within the common institutions. Ultimately, it argues that the informal
and ad hoc cooperation that has been the underlying facilitator of synergy between
the two organisations outside of Berlin Plus missions could start to atrophy if a
grand or intermediary bargain is not achieved in the near future.
Although it is becoming a somewhat hackneyed expression, we are living in an
age where civilian and military instruments and capabilities go ‘hand in hand’
(Luciolli 2009). However, this does not make the statement any less true. Most
commentators and actors (even those actors not yet willing to see it go) agree that
Berlin Plus is outdated and a straitjacket. In this sense, EUNATO relations really
are ‘stuck in the 1990s’. To attempt to address the lacuna in the research regarding
EUNATO cooperation, as expressed through day to day operating procedures and
through institutional and military channels, this article proceeds as follows: There is
a brief outline of the different actors involved and what can be expected from their
various interests and identities within EUNATO institutions. The main section of
the article looks at formal and informal cooperation in Brussels and in common
mission areas. Finally, the concept of institutional fatigue is addressed with some
policy recommendations suggested.
Differentiating between state, international, and military actors
At this point, it is germane to outline the different levels of actors working within
EUNATO institutions. The first are state actors. These actors work in both the EU
and NATO institutions as well as in the national capitals, be it in the ministries of
defence (MODs) or foreign ministries (MOFAs). Within NATO, there are the
national delegations of all 28 member states headed by an ambassador to the
organisation. In the EU Council, there are the permanent representatives from the 27
member states also headed by an ambassador (26: baring in mind that Cyprus is not
present at the formal level of EUNATO discussions). The highest level of
cooperation involving these actors is the bi-monthly NAC-PSC meetings, which
convene at the level of ambassador. As mentioned above, the foreign ministers have
not met since 2003; however, there are the so-called Transatlantic Events (see below)
through which the relevant foreign ministers engage each other on an informal basis.
It is at the level of nations that NATOEU cooperation is currently at deadlock
owing to the participation problem. This deadlock at the political level has meant
sub-optimal EUNATO cooperation in many areas of strategic mutual interest. This
article explores the effect of that deadlock as well as the informal, yet, sub-optimal
attempts to mitigate the impasse at all three levels of interaction and in various types
of operations.
Second, there is the level of the international staff. There are contacts between the
two organisations at the secretariat level, both civilian and military. The Interna-
tional Staff at NATO are recruited from member countries, either directly by the
organisation or seconded by their governments.9
The International Staff supports the process of consensus-building and decision-making
between member and Partner countries and is responsible for the preparation and
follow-up of the meetings and decisions of NATO committees, as well as those of the
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institutions created to manage the different forms of bilateral and multilateral
partnership with non-member countries established since the end of the Cold War.10
On the EU side, there has been a restructuring of the institutions, particularly post-
Lisbon Treaty. The EU Council Secretariat has rationalised DG 8 (military) and DG
9 (civilian) into one new directorate called the Crisis Management Planning
Directorate (CMPD).11 Contacts between the EU and NATO staff are open and
transparent, while always having to work within the red lines caused by the
participation problem. It is expected that these actors would generally work with
the interests of their respective institutions in mind. However, they are operating in
more of a support capacity and, therefore, do not usually retain the clout to
overcome the impasse brought about by the political deadlock.
Finally, this article addresses the military actors involved. Crucially, it is
concerned with both military staff working in Brussels within both military and
civilian roles, as well as military commanders working within mission areas where
both the EU and NATO are engaged. This includes formal Berlin Plus operations
(CONCORDIA and ALTHEA), non-agreed framework missions where both
organisations occupy the same geographical space, albeit performing different
functions (Kosovo and Afghanistan), and non-agreed framework missions where
they are performing similar duties in the same operational theatre without formal
arrangements for cooperation (NATO: Operation Ocean Shield and the EU:
Operation ATALANTA).
In NATO, there are of course meetings between the Ministers of Defence.
However, in order to assist the highest level civilian bodies there are ‘senior military
officers’ who serve as national Military Representatives and on the Military
Committee. This body also meets at the level of Chiefs of Defence (CHODs).
However, the day to day work of the Military Committee is managed by the Military
Representatives who support their CHODs. According to the NATO Handbook, the
Mil Reps ‘work in a national capacity, representing the best interests of their nations
while remaining open to negotiation and discussion so that consensus can be
reached’.12 Within NATO there is also the International Military Staff (IMS) who
are made up of both military and civilian personnel. As with the International staff,
they are supposed to work towards the overall common interest of the Alliance and
not on behalf of their respective nations.13 Finally, this article notes the understated
(in the literature) importance of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
(DSACEUR) regarding this post’s proclivity to initiate action in the face of political
blockage. This post is double-hatted (NATOEU) and is always a European14
commander. The DSACEUR has the responsibility of command once the EU avails
herself of NATO assets and capabilities under arrangements known as the Berlin
Plus Agreement.15 However, staff in both organisations have commented that it is
through this office that the ‘real business’16 of EUNATO cooperation is being
sustained, especially with regard to facilitating informal cooperation for non-Berlin
Plus operations where both organisations are deployed.
On the EU side, the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest
military body within the Council. This body, like the NATO equivalent, is made up
of the CHODs and is assisted by the permanent military representatives.17 This body
is the primary advisory body to the PSC. Within the EU framework there is also the
European Union Military Staff (EUMS). This body, again like NATO’s equivalent,
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is made up of both civilian and military personnel through secondment to the
Council Secretariat by the member states. Alongside these bodies is the newly formed
CMPD  an integrated Civ/Mil unit as outlined above.
Before moving on to the main section of this article, a few comments are
germane. First, the most efficient cooperation between EUNATO military actors
falls within Berlin Plus agreed operations. However, for non-Berlin Plus operations,
generally speaking, the further cooperation gets from the centre (Brussels) and the
political implications that it entails, the more likely cooperation will be transparent
but purely at the informal level. In other words, commanders in the field of non-
Berlin Plus operations do work together despite the lack of official agreements to do
so. However, this is not without some implications. Second, like relations between the
EU and NATO International Staff, cooperation between the International Military
Staff is more synergetic and productive than those at the purely political level.
Relations at the level of MODs, especially including Cyprus, have difficulties
cooperating and at the level of military representatives (MILREPS), even informal
cooperation is problematic, owing once again to the participation problem. Finally,
to date, the EU does not have a completely autonomous operations headquarters
similar to NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).
However, there is an EU cell18 at SHAPE as well as a NATO liaison team at
EUMS to help facilitate open and transparent cooperation. Some have suggested
that these two bodies are asymmetrical. Furthermore, there is both a NATO and an
EU command centre at Northwood, England operating side-by-side to tackle their
respective anti-piracy missions (Ocean Shield and ATALANTA). These are examples
of EU and NATO personnel working, if not in the same room, then in close
proximity to each other.
EUNATO cooperation at the centre
The main body of this article addresses the various levels of EUNATO institutional
relations at the centre (Brussels) and on the ground (mission areas). These relations
are examined with regard to both their formal institutions and as informal and ad
hoc arrangements that supplement for blockages that occur at the formal level. All
three levels of actors outlined above are considered.
The highest point of formal institutional contact between the EU and NATO is at
the level of nation-states. The institutional gathering that facilitates EUNATO
cooperation at this level is the NAC-PSC ambassadorial meetings; the first of which
took place on 5 February 2001 (before 2001 PSC was an interim body). Since 2001,
these events have taken place regularly, with varying frequency of between four and
ten times per year.19 From 2001 until 2003, these two bodies met with an agenda that
covered the full spectrum of common issues. For example, the NAC-PSC discussed
geographical issues such as Afghanistan, Moldova, and Kosovo as well as issues of
proliferation, energy security, and trans-national terrorism.20 However, 2004 and the
enlargement of the EU changed the political situation causing a drastic contraction
of the issues allowed on the formal agenda. This contraction was caused by what has
commonly been referred to as the ‘participation problem’.
The ‘participation problem’ refers to various political obstacles that have, since
2004, drastically reduced the scope of effective cooperation between the EU and
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NATO. The Presidency conclusions from the 2002 EU Copenhagen Council state
that:
‘[T]he Berlin Plus’ arrangements and the implementation thereof will apply only to
those EU Member States which are also either NATO members or parties to the
‘Partnership for Peace’, and which have consequently concluded bilateral security
arrangements with NATO.21
This agreement has resulted in Berlin Plus becoming effectively a straitjacket for
EUNATO cooperation since the EU will not meet formally with NATO to discuss
issues that fall outside of the Berlin Plus format (currently only operation ALTHEA)
without all 27 of its members present. NATO will not meet with the EU in a formal
setting with nations that are not at least members of the Partnership for Peace (PfP).
Therefore, the broad scope of issues that were once on the formal agenda has since
disappeared. The ‘participation problem’ is directly related to the existential dispute
existing between Turkey (member of NATO but not the EU) and Cyprus (member of
the EU but not NATO). Turkey uses its membership of NATO to block Cyprus
joining the PfP, while Cyprus uses its membership of the EU to ensure that no
matters outside of Berlin Plus are discussed at the NAC-PSC level. Both sides of this
divide have seized on this issue to leverage the other in any future settlement of
Cyprus. Formal EUNATO cooperation will stay dysfunctional until the issue is
resolved; in this way it has become ‘collateral damage’22 of the 2004 Cypriot Annan
Plan Referendum.23
The ‘participation problem’ and its resulting ‘scope problem’ should not be
underestimated. Still another casualty of this political blockage was the bi-annual
EUNATO foreign ministers meetings as called for in the 2001 exchange of letters
between the EU Presidency and the NATO Sec/Gen. From 2001 to 2003, these
meetings took place in line with this request and all common issues of concern were
on the agenda. The last of these official foreign ministers meetings took place on 4
December 2003. However, since September 2005, these meetings have continued in
an informal setting known as the ‘Transatlantic Events’.24 This attempt to overcome
blockage at the formal and political level was initiated by US Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice in 2005. She used the excuse of a United Nations General
Assembly meeting to invite all of the EU and NATO Foreign Affairs Ministers
(including Cyprus and Turkey) to informally discuss and hopefully overcome the
EUNATO deadlock. These meetings have since been conducted on average twice a
year, either in New York or in a European capitol. At the time of writing, the last
such meeting took place on 9 December 2009.25 These meetings have been
productive, but so far unsuccessful in overcoming the impasse. As time has gone
on, these meetings have been used less and less to discuss overcoming EUNATO
deadlock and the focus has shifted to other issues such as nuclear proliferation and
Iran (Table 1).
This is a symptom of the greater problem of institutional fatigue described below
regarding EUNATO cooperation. As Yost has pointed out; ‘while such informal
dialogue is obviously superior to having none at all, the prospects of informal NATO
EU mechanisms are inherently limited and less than fully satisfactory’ (Yost 2007,
pp. 9798). For example, Turkey seems happy to meet within this ‘Transatlantic
Event’ format at the level of foreign ministers, however, they have rebuffed proposals
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to carry this informal framework to the level of Ministers of Defence as well.26 What
all these problems have created are the political ‘redlines’ that encompass all of EU
NATO relations. These ‘redlines’ are the lines of demarcation that the International
Staff have to work within and be mindful of on a day to day basis.
When asked where the greatest synergy exists between the EU and NATO in
Brussels, one interviewee responded, ‘between staff to staff and between Secretary-
General/High Representative and the NATO Secretary General’.27 However, before
addressing cooperation through these actors, it is important to outline just how
‘redlines’ affect actors’ ability to execute work on a day to day basis. There has been a
vast amount of energy and goodwill spent trying to circumvent political blockage in
order to facilitate EUNATO cooperation. However, unrewarded efforts can last
only so long before they begin to atrophy from fatigue.
The most notable ‘redline’ caused by the ‘participation problem’ relates to the
exchanging of documents between the organisations. A NATO restricted document
(classified) can only be sent to EU member states that have signed security
agreements with NATO. The Berlin Plus agreement itself was made classified at
the time of its initiation for exactly this reason. Therefore, when a confidential
document is to be sent to the EU, NATO has two options. First, if the material is
covered by the agreed framework (Berlin Plus and some capability issues), then
NATO staff send it to the EU knowing that it will only be disseminated to 26
member states (Cyprus is excluded). Second, if the material is classified but is not
covered in the Berlin Plus framework, for example Kosovo, Afghanistan, terrorism,
Table 1. NATOEU official meetings at Ministers of Foreign Affairs’ level and informal
transatlantic events.
Official meetings (20012003)
30 May 2001 Budapest (HU)
6 December 2001 Brussels  EU Justus Lipsius Bldg
14 May 2002 Reykjavik (IC)
3 April 2003 Brussels  NATO HQ (informal NATOEU working
lunch)
3 June 2003 Madrid (SP)
4 December 2003 Brussels  NATO HQ
Informal transatlantic events (2005. . .)
20 September 2005 New York (lunch)
7 December 2005 Brussels (dinner)
27 April 2006 Sofia (BU) (dinner)
22 September 2006 New York  in the margins of UNGA (dinner)
26 January 2007 Brussels (dinner)
26 April 2007 Oslo (dinner)
26 September 2007 New York  in the margins of UNGA (dinner)
7 December 2007 Brussels (dinner)
24 September 2008 New York (dinner)
2 December 2008 Brussels (dinner)
4 March 2009 Brussels (dinner)
22 September 2009 New York  in the margins of UNGA (dinner)
3 December 2009 Brussels (dinner)
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or energy security, then NATO staff recognise that these issues are dealt with at 27
EU member states and, therefore, they will not pass on the document to their EU
staff counterpart. This issue is further complicated because documents that are under
the control of the originator, for example NATO non-classified documents, are also
held back as these too would be released to all EU 27 member states. The result is
that only documents related to Operation ALTHEA and certain capability issues are
officially passed between staff.
Since the EU enlargement of 2004, contacts between staff have increased to try
and ‘compensate but not substitute’ for the political deadlock.28 The EU and NATO
staffers are constantly trying to ‘compensate’ for the lack of political contacts, while
always mindful of redlines set by nations. One NATO interviewee stated that he was
on the phone with his EU counterparts ‘on a regular basis’ and that there is a
‘common enough interest and belief in the staff that this is what we do, so we just
have to find away’. Not all personnel shared the same opinion and one even
described them as merely ‘talk and banalities’. Of course turf wars play a part in this
equation as well. When NATO staff meets with staff in the EU Commission, their
Council counterparts can often get ‘upset’.29 In fact, when staff in the Council was
asked their opinion regarding a potential Berlin Plus in reverse (whereby the EU
transfers civilian capabilities to NATO) one answer was ‘that makes no sense’.30 Yet,
when posed the same question in NATO or the Commission, the answers were more
supportive of such a concept. However, there seems to be no consensus within the
Alliance to lead a civilian-crisis mission at the moment.
Some readers may find any level of interaction between NATO and the EU
Commission surprising as the ESDP was a second pillar EU competence. While it
was ‘fully associated’ to CFSP/ESDP under the Nice Treaty (article 18.4), it is not
associated at all to CFSP/CSDP under the Lisbon Treaty, which in practice means
that its role in this area has significantly reduced to nothing. The EUNATO
relations are part of CFSP/CSDP and since the Commission has now been formally
excluded from this policy area, this entails that there are even less legal possibilities
for direct Commission-NATO relations under the new treaty. Certainly, the
relationship is adolescent and a history of ‘zero security culture’ prevented any
relationship in the 1990s.31 Since the inception of Berlin Plus, however, this former
‘house of glass’ has been heavily securitised in some departments allowing for a
relationship to develop. Before 2004, seminars that included issues such as terrorism
began to take place between NATO, the Council, and the Commission. However,
post-2004 only Berlin Plus classified materials that were passed to the EU Council
were then shared with the Commission, for example through the DG for External
Relations.
The Commission was only connected to the NAC-PSC agenda because they sent
a representative when these institutions met. However, if the Council and the
Commission do not agree, then they cannot talk for each other (Yost 2007, p. 91).
The Commission had a further role through joint Commission Council bodies.
Through these bodies, information was fed through to the Commission as an
‘unintended consequence but a welcomed one’. This is a very important formal link,
as were the informal get-togethers on the margins of these meetings. This is the only
real link the Commission had with NATO or EUNATO cooperation and as such,
they were ‘all very much attached to it’. Of course, since 2004, this relationship has
also been affected due to the reduction in volume and scope of information filtering
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through. There had been an appetite by the Commission as well as NATO to develop
relationships. However, these moves of rapprochement were blocked ‘harshly’ by
Turkey, Cyprus, and to some extent, Greece.32 It would seem that the Commission
was the victim of the same political developments in this issue area since
enlargement. Recent interviews that have probed whether personnel who were
formerly part of DG RELEX and DG DEV and who have been transferred to EEAS
can now talk more openly to NATO IS, have resulted in no definite answer as yet
because it is still a grey area at the time of writing.
We all want to assume that it should be possible and we will try it, but as always the test
will be a success only if none of the usual suspects complains and stands in the way.
There has been no test case so far, so we are not sure yet, but we will certainly try at the
first occasion, it’s the only way we can find out where the new limits are.33
What this suggests is that institutional relations are instrumental in facilitating what
EU-NATO cooperation there is in the face of such political posturing, even if issues
outside of the Berlin Plus arrangements must be kept informal and discreet. Staffers
exchange information, compare notes, but they are ‘chats only’.34 Much of EU
NATO business between staff and experts is unofficial and, therefore, it is impossible
to have ‘concrete’ outcomes rewarded in official policy. Ultimately, these exchanges
based only on a certain degree of reciprocity may be viewed as exercises in futility,
especially if certain actors start to believe that information is only heading in one
direction as some staff have suggested.
As mentioned, the relationship between the NATO Sec/Gen and the EU SG/
HR35 has also been crucial for cooperation and synergy between the two
organisations. At a purely formal level, the NAC-PSC meetings are co-chaired by
both of these posts. The SG/HR has also been invited to all meetings of the NAC at
the level of foreign and defence ministers. However, the NATO Sec/Gen is usually
only invited to EU defence ministerial meetings (Yost 2007, p.91). More important
than the formal settings for overcoming deadlock are the one-to-one meetings that
take place regularly between the Sec/Gen and the EU SG/HR as well as the pressure
these actors bring to bear in order to overcome self-interested demands from the
member states.
The personal relationship that develops between them and how they prioritise
each other’s organisation has real implications. By all accounts, the SEC/GEN and
the SG/HR meet very regularly, although at the time of writing, the relationship
between Sec/Gen Anders Fogh Rasmussen and the new H/R of the Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security, Baroness Ashton, has yet to be set. Given time,
however, there does seem to be a broad feeling that this relationship will be
productive in this area. As for the relationship between Javier Solana and Jaap de
Hoop Scheffer, although they met quite regularly, comments on their personal
relationship have varied from ‘not very nice’ to ‘inefficient’. That aside, a series of
meetings between Solana and de Hoop Scheffer led to calls for more robust EU
NATO cooperation and to comments such as: ‘it is astounding how narrow the
bandwidth of cooperation between NATO and the Union has remained’ and that
NATOEU relations have not really arrived in the twenty-first century yet. They are
still stuck in the 1990s.36
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The pressure in Brussels emanating from member states often stems from the
competition over the initiation of missions and over which organisation should take
the lead. To be clear, this is not as much about competition between the organisations
or between Sec/Gen and H/R, although there can be some ‘ego problems’ in this
regard, as it is about nation-states using either NATO or the EU as a tool for their
own political purposes.37 One case in point is Darfur. This crisis situation, one in
which both the EU and NATO ran autonomous operations simultaneously, is often
touted as a ‘beauty contest’ (Grevi et al. 2009, Yost 2007, p. 81). It can be more
accurately described as a fight between Paris and London: Paris trying to avoid
NATO (US) involvement in Africa and London trying to avoid the marginalisation
of NATO in any major conflict. This led to a lot of pressure on the Sec/Gen (from
London) and the EU H/R (from Paris) in the lead up to these missions. Ultimately,
this was more about tasking by mission for these two actors. The coordination and
initiation periods of these operations was ‘a mess’,38 but this could have been
avoided. With less pressure from the two capitols, the situation could have been
handled in a much smoother way. It should be noted that France has reintegrated
into NATO (2008), so political wrangling over sequencing should be reduced going
forward.
There is a relationship between NATO and the Commission as noted above.
Although Sec/Gen Robertson was not concerned with this relationship, Sec/Gen de
Hoop Scheffer went out of his way to change this by attempting to make NATO
‘politically universal’ and to try and further develop a relationship between the
Commission and NATO. However, in practise, there are meetings between NATO
Sec/Gen and the EU Commission President, however, they are kept quiet and
without ‘beef ’ and ‘real purpose’.39 In the end, EUNATO cooperation at the level
of staff in Brussels does get done at the level of the Secretariat, be it civil or military.
Nevertheless, once this work reaches a certain level, one that calls for the political
translation of work, it comes up against the political blockage that prevents real
integrated cooperation from occurring. However, when there is a good relationship
between the Sec/Gen and the EU H/R, this does lead to enhanced cooperation, albeit
ad hoc and informal, and can reduce the problems created by the political impasse to
a certain extent.
Lt. Gen. David Leakey (Director General of the EUMS) is keen to draw
attention to the fact that ‘the cause of the problem in the EUNATO relationship lies
at the very highest level, in the fixed positions of certain states rather than within the
machinery of the Organisations themselves’ (Leakey 2008). Although this may be an
over simplification of the matter, this article is in line with his perception. When it
comes to formal cooperation between the military bodies in Brussels, these too are
the victim of the political blockage as described above. The EUMC is the highest
military body in the EU (Howorth 2007, p. 74). This body is highly cooperational in
one respect as 21 of the CHODs are double-hatted as military representatives to the
NATO military committee as well. They meet as a body twice a year in their EU
capacity and at least three times a year at NATO. More often, the EUMC is
convened at the level of MILREPS who are also double-hatted to assist their NATO
representatives (Howorth 2007, p. 74). Furthermore, the Chairman of the EUMC
attends meetings of the NAC-PSC, the Council, and the NATO Military Committee.
Within the EU Council Secretariat, there are the DGE 8 (military) and DGE 9
(civilian) bodies that play a fundamental role in the conception and development of
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ESDP (these two institutions have merged into the newly formed CMPD). It is DGE
8 that navigates the ‘sensitive dossier’ of ESDPNATO relations as well as ‘the
application of the Berlin Plus agreements and the negotiation of the technical
arrangements necessary to streamline EUNATO cooperation in the theatre’ (Grevi
et al. 2009, p. 37). Finally, for purposes here, within the Council Secretariat there is
the EUMS, which is directly attached to the SG/HR and works under the direction of
the EUMC (Grevi et al. 2009, p. 40). Clearly, under Berlin Plus operations, there are
EUNATO contacts (28-26 with Cyprus not present) between all these bodies and
they are ‘formal and agreed’.40 On the EU side, it is not fully agreeable as the
member states would prefer to operate at 27. Yet, as with their civilian counterparts,
this is the situation in which they find themselves.
At the level of the MODs, for political directors of MODs and MILREPS, the
situation is only formal at the 28-26 format. There have been some attempts to
overcome the political impasse in the military arena as well, but it has been met with
mixed results. There was an attempt to meet informally at 28-27 with the Political
Directors, but this attempt failed due to the Turkish representative declining to
participate.41 At the level of MILREPS, there has also been no success at bringing
them together, even at the informal level. However, it is the office of the DSACEUR
through which the real business of EUNATO cooperation is getting done.42
Under the Berlin Plus agreements, when the EU makes a request to NATO for a
‘NATO European command option’ for an EU-led operation, it is the DSACEUR
who is the primary candidate for the EU operational commander.43 This mechanism
is supposed to allow the DSACEUR to assume his European responsibilities ‘fully
and effectively’. For example, this agreement cleared the way for the DSACEUR to
become the operational commander in operation ALTHEA, which ‘enabled the
transition of responsibility’, ‘optimised’ the use of forces, and avoided ‘duplication’.44
In the 1990s, it seemed like a whiz-bang idea. You avoid duplication, you put the whole
thing in SHAPE, and the EU uses NATO military capabilities, and is therefore subject
to NATO planning. You use the DSACEUR as the strategic commander and that
seemed to be the sense of where we ought to go at that time. Now, 15 years down the
line, we realise that this was incredibly short sighted.45
The ‘short-sighted’ vision that is being referred to is, first of all, that the EU proved
capable of running most of their operations using purely national headquarters and
not SHAPE, even without a permanent operational HQ of its own. Second, it has
been the policy of certain member states that Berlin Plus would be the exception
rather than the rule. Hence, there have been eight ESDP/CSDP military missions
with only two utilising Berlin Plus and SHAPE.
For a Berlin Plus operation this is coherent and efficient. The overall mission is
under the responsibility of the Council, but the operational chain of command (CoC)
runs directly through the DSACEUR’s office at SHAPE, through Allied Joint Force
Command Naples (in the case of ALTHEA), and to the ground in Sarajevo. In the
early years, there were worries in the EU that this arrangement would preference
NATO over the EU. The EU had to know that the DSACEUR would answer to
them first and foremost with EU-led operations. Starting from Admiral Feist, who
commanded Berlin Plus operations in Macedonia to the current DSACEUR, this
has been the case.46 However, there are now cases where the EU is operating in
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the same space as NATO (Afghanistan and Kosovo) without an agreed framework.
Here too the DSACEUR seems to be invaluable. Regarding the initial Berlin Plus
operations, a link was created between the EU Council Secretariat (DG 8) and the
DSACEUR. They held regular meetings and a pattern was established. Once this
link was customary, they kept up the pattern of meetings even for non-Berlin Plus
operations  in fact for all operations  and at the highest levels (now CMPD and
DSACEUR).47
According to Jamie Shea48 at NATO, one dilemma diplomats experience is that
when they realise problems can be figured out at the working level, they often
question whether it really matters if they find political solutions; ones that may seem
idealistic but are not necessary for carrying out operations. His opinion, based on the
advice from the highest military levels, is that yes it does matter.49 Without formal
agreements and docking mechanisms at every level from the top-down, there are only
the individual bi-lateral agreements, which are very time-consuming. There is always
a problem or disconnect in terms of information and intelligence sharing. Although
the military can find work-a-rounds, they prefer a single agreement that would allow
all this to be done at SHAPE and with one memorandum of understanding (MOU).
Yet this is the situation commanders find themselves in. The DSACEUR’s office,
both current and past, has been instrumental in finding solutions where there are no
agreements. General Sir. John McColl, the current DSACEUR, has performed as a
key interlocutor between the EU and NATO in order to get requests approved
around the NAC-PSC political problems,50 utilising his dual hat obligations even
concerning non-Berlin Plus issues. However, questions arise as to whether the office
of the DSACEUR is enough to facilitate cooperation in those mission areas in which
EU and NATO both find themselves. It is to this subject that this article now turns.
EUNATO cooperation on the ground
The aim of this section is to briefly overview the five missions that best sum up the
totality of EU-NATO cooperation in the field: this includes formal Berlin Plus
operations (CONCORDIA and ALTHEA), non-agreed framework missions where
both organisations occupy the same geographical space, albeit performing different
functions (Kosovo and Afghanistan), and non-agreed framework missions where
they are performing similar duties in the same operational theatre but without formal
arrangements for cooperation (NATO: Operation Ocean Shield and the EU:
Operation ATALANTA). The Berlin Plus operations have an integrated command
structure running from the EU Council through NATO capabilities and directly to
on the ground operations. In these cases, the framework of cooperation is agreed
from the highest levels down. Regarding Kosovo and Afghanistan, both the EU and
NATO are operating in the same hostile or semi-hostile space, performing different
duties, but without an agreed framework for cooperation. In both cases, the EU is
operating a civilian mission while NATO is conducting a military component.
Moreover, the EU is reliant on NATO for the protection of its civilian personnel in-
theatre. This section also briefly looks at the anti-piracy missions being run in the
Gulf of Aden simultaneously by the EU and NATO. The second aim of this section is
to address both formal and informal cooperation as it pertains to these missions and
with all three levels of actors outlined above. It should be noted that this is only
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intended to be a brief overview in order to allow for a contrasting of both formal and
informal cooperation.
Although two EU-led missions have been operationalised utilising the Berlin Plus
arrangements, it could be argued that neither were initiated in line with the original
intentions of this agreement. Berlin Plus makes available the full spectrum of NATO
collective assets and capabilities for EU-led crisis operations where ‘NATO as a
whole is not engaged’. However, in both CONCORDIA and ALTHEA, the EU
assumed command of operations that NATO was previously conducting.51 That
being said, CONCORDIA was the EU’s first involvement in military crisis
management when it agreed to takeover command from NATO on 18 March
2003.52 This mission, in terms of military intensity, was rather modest, consisting of
350 personnel working in 22 light field liaison teams (Grevi et al. 2009, p. 176).
However, it was a key test of both the EU’s ability to undertake military crises
missions and of the fledgling EUNATO relationship.
Eva Gross has pointed out that EUNATO relations regarding this mission
presented significant ‘external coordination challenges’.(Grevi et al. 2009, p. 177)
Besides the operational challenges consisting of a CoC schematic running from the
Council, SHAPE, AFSOUTH/Naples to the regional headquarters on the ground,
there were also coordination elements ‘required in the field’. The fact that NATO
maintained its own presence in the country, and that intelligence sharing had not
been approved before the launch of the mission, caused considerable challenges.
Essentially, the EU was forced to make difficult decisions between closer cooperation
with NATO or its own civilian/political bodies. However, it must be remembered that
this was the EU’s first attempt at military crisis-management and, overall, this
mission was a success due to integrated command from the top-down allowing for
cooperation at all levels. There was the political will and all three organisations in the
area (EUOSCENATO) worked well to complement each other.53 However, this
model of ‘chemistry’, it could be argued, has not been reproduced or replicated since
Macedonia.
By the time the EU implemented operation ALTHEA (December 2004) as a
takeover mission form NATO’s SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), NATO had
already scaled back troop numbers from around 60,000 to just 7000 (Howorth 2007,
p. 235). However, in matching the latter number, the EU mission is still the largest
military operation the EU has undertaken to date. Currently, troop strength is just
under 2000.54 As with CONCORDIA, the EU operation in BiH is carried out with
recourse to the collective assets and capabilities of NATO (SHAPE) through Berlin
Plus, utilising the DSACEUR as the operational commander. The CoC is also the
same as in CONCORDIA, running from the Council, through SHAPE, to Naples
and down into the operational theatre. This means that cooperation on the ground is
clearly stated and agreed through an operational framework that sees cooperation at
every level. There are contacts between ambassadors, military committees, and
experts.
As noted, operation ALTHEA is currently the only formal topic of discussion at
the NAC-PSC level, barring some capability issues. However, this operation has been
going on for so long and with a level of military intensity so low that NAC-PSC
meetings have become less infrequent as there is not enough business to justify or
sustain them. There has been discussion for some time now about ending the military
mission in BiH and replacing it with an EU non-executive civil mission.55 This raises
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two key issues regarding EUNATO cooperation: (1) Berlin Plus was not designed
for civil-military cooperation and (2) since NATO retains a security sector reform
(SSR) mission in Bosnia, it would mean that both organisations would essentially be
performing civil missions in the same area with an agreed framework that is not
designed for this type of cooperation. Berlin Plus has been successful in allowing the
implementation of two key EU-led military operations. It has allowed the EU to
carefully expand its nascent ESDP structures and to test-run its military crisis
management capabilities with a relatively soft introduction in this area. However,
certain nation states have sought to keep EUNATO cooperation directly tied to
Berlin Plus and thus not allowing for a broadening of scope regarding issues of
common interest. The lack of formal EUNATO cooperation in Kosovo and
Afghanistan is the micro expression of that failure.
Currently, there are just under 10,000 NATO troops detailed to NATO’s KFOR
mission in Kosovo in order to maintain a ‘safe and secure environment’.56 The EU,
through their EULEX rule-of-law mission, has 1650 international staff and 1050
local staff under its own authority to assist the reform of the local civil and police
institutions.57 Although the environment is not as dangerous as it has been in years
past, the potential for trouble that could demand a kinetic military response is very
real. The EU’s civil mission is, therefore, ultimately dependent on NATO for their
protection. To be clear, it is the political deadlock in Brussels that has created the
situation whereby all EUNATO cooperation regarding Kosovo is ad hoc and
informal. It is a situation where the actors working at the level of nation states turn
a blind eye, the international staffs do what they can, and military operational
commanders work it out on the ground because ‘necessity is the mother of all
invention’.58
As stated, there is no political agreement regarding EUNATO cooperation over
Kosovo, as proposals in this area have been blocked by Turkey as they object to EU
NATO cooperation, beyond Berlin Plus, that involves all 27 EU states.59 Instead,
there are four technical agreements that were signed on the ground in order to
facilitate cooperation.60 However, there is not one set of documents signed by
representatives of both organisations. Two separate, but identical, documents worked
their way down the CoC to be signed separately in the field. States like Turkey turn a
blind eye to these agreements and allow cooperation to transpire as long as it is
carried out discreetly. They are fully aware that the EULEX and KFOR
commanders are working together. They are also aware that if there were EU
casualties due to some EUNATO disconnect, then a major scandal would ensue.
However, some have stated that these agreements are weak and time-consuming, to
the extent that they potentially put people’s lives at risk.61 As demonstrated below,
this is even more the case in Afghanistan due to the nature of its hostile environment.
At the staff to staff level, if there are problems between the NATO HQ and the
EU HQ, again they are dealt with on the ground, sensitively, and without high
political visibility. In this case, EU civilian staff is working with NATO military staff,
so they do not really have the right tools to cooperate. What is not well documented
is the fact that there are both Turkish experts and Cypriot experts working within
EULEX.62 This reality is not found in any official document relating to this mission
and certain parties are rather keen to keep this away from the press and public
opinion. Cyprus is officially stated as a non-contributor to the mission and most
academic literature notes this as well. This demonstrates that differing states are
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somewhat able to work together and do not oppose the situation on the ground. This
is done to show flexibility in the face of increasing frustration by staff, experts, and
military personnel voiced through proposal papers and through informal institu-
tional channels.
At the military level, there are commanders in the field with contacts. EULEX is
a comparatively bigger mission to that of EUPOL in Afghanistan for example, but
the commanders are able talk to each other despite official agreements, both at the
HQ level and between nations. There has been increased frustration from these
commanders over the lack of official cooperation. To date, however, this frustration
has not reached the critical point whereby the political impasse is overcome. Due to
the large number of EU and NATO personnel in Kosovo, if the situation on the
ground were more volatile, this could change.
In Afghanistan, the only saving grace with regards to EU (EUPOL) and NATO
(ISAF) cooperation is that the size of EUPOL/Afghanistan is quite modest and the
commanders in the field have been able to cooperate in the open due to states turning
a blind eye once again. The EUPOL mission only consists of 273 international staff
and 160 local staff.63 Although EUPOL is quite modest and mainly entails police
training of a ‘qualitative nature, targeting mid-to-senior-levels of management’
(Grevi et al. 2009, p. 333) in Kabul, it does also consist of personnel working out in
the provinces. According to Luis Peral: (Grevi et al. 2009, p. 333):
The absence of a comprehensive EUNATO agreement on the provision of security for
EUPOL staff through ISAF, and their inability to formally exchange classified
information, due to the different membership of the two organisations, has hindered
closer cooperation between the EU and NATO in the critical Afghan theatre.
Afghanistan is a very bad example of EUNATO ‘complementarity’ and the
technical agreements for cooperation, unlike with Kosovo, were not even drafted.64
In place of a political arrangement, the EU has had to negotiate 14 separate MOUs
on the protection of its personnel. These MOUs are not between EU states and
NATO, they are between EU and individual lead nations; a situation that is
‘absurd’.65 Most of the cooperation in the field takes place at ‘donor meetings’ where
all the organisations involved in Afghanistan are able to gather. These meetings are
used as forums for information exchange whereby all those in-theatre are aware of
what each other are doing and of any potential threats in the area. There is a reality
whereby cooperation in the field is open and transparent, but in Brussels it is all
‘discreet and secretive’.66 Furthermore, EUPOL staff is dependent on NATO for
travel in and out of the theatre. For example, if a EUPOL head of mission needs to
go to Kabul, they must take NATO flights. However, due to the current CoC, the
EUPOL delegate is low on the priority list and may spend a day waiting for
transport.
At the military level, commanders are working well in the field and those nation
states that are disruptive in Brussels are fully aware that EUPOL and ISAF
commanders are cooperating. However, without a formal agreement between the EU
and NATO, EU personnel are unable to be included in the NATO’s Blue Force
tracking system. This system allows NATO to know where all of its personnel are at
any given moment. Instead, they have had to arrange individual agreements with
provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) for their security when working outside of
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Kabul (Grevi et al. 2009, p. 333). There is growing frustration from both staff and
military personnel regarding this situation. Yet, as with Kosovo, there does not seem
to be the level of frustration to overcome the political impasse. If the EUPOL
mission consisted of 30004000 personnel, the situation could be different.
The various anti-piracy missions deployed in the Gulf of Aden are more
international in design and through this international process, EUNATO coopera-
tion is more hidden and, therefore, more effective.67 What this means is that the
‘redlines’ described above relating to the transfer of classified material, although still
problematic, they have led to anti-piracy, in terms of EUNATO cooperation,
becoming a real laboratory for informal cooperation. There is a calculated
determination, especially at the operational level, to push the boundaries of what
can be achieved. The fact that both ATALANTA and Ocean Shield are maritime
operations uniquely allows for sensitive intelligence to be passed from ship to ship as
well as over the table. However, both NATO and the EU are conducting
simultaneous operation in the Gulf and this does lead to a certain amount of
competition.
The main issue facing those EU or NATO member states wanting to insert a ship
into an operation is which organisation to ‘be nice to’.68 Most of the states that are
members of both organisations have chosen to operate under the EU ATALANTA
flag, as this mission is much better resourced: more ships, better maritime patrol
aircraft, and the legal arrangements with countries in the Gulf to transport captured
pirates. The real issue is for the non-EU member states of NATO, particularly
Canada and Turkey. They have chosen to insert ships into NATO’s Ocean Shield
because they will retain full command and control, unlike if they were to deploy in
ATALANTA.
The main operational HQ is situated in Bahrain where there is both an EU and
NATO presence. There is also a joint situation cell operating in Northwood, England
where EU and NATO personnel are working in close proximity to one another. This
is a kind of fusion centre where intelligence (greatly enhanced by the USA) is
collected and passed on from NATO to the EU. The UK seems to have the know-
how to ensure that all the various forces work together. Some interviews revealed that
certain actors in NATO would be willing to collapse Operation Ocean Shield and let
the EU operation take the lead; mainly due to the fact that the number one priority
for NATO is currently Afghanistan. Furthermore, there is a growing consensus in
NATO circles that the EU has a superior mission given its ability to act at the
political level in a way that NATO currently just cannot. Yet, the EU is seemingly
dependent on NATO for additional capabilities and assets and is unwilling to see this
operation go. The fact remains that only a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ underpins EU
NATO cooperation at all levels leading those who work at the operational level,
especially, to admit that both organisations are needed to keep current levels of
piracy from increasing dramatically.
Institutional fatigue
The main section of this article has tried to develop three arguments. First, it is due
to the fixed positions of nation states more than the design of the EU and NATO as
international organisations that prevent real cooperation or the advancement of a
strategic partnership between them. Second, it is the military actors, either in the
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field or in the centre, that get the real business of EUNATO cooperation done. To
achieve this, they often have to go beyond the level of formal arrangements, especially
when both organisations find themselves in common mission areas but without the
Berlin Plus agreed framework for cooperation. Finally, since the EU enlargement of
2004, contacts between staff as well as experts have increased to try and ‘compensate
but not substitute’ for the political deadlock.
This section argues that it is the latter level of actors who are most susceptible to
institutional fatigue because it is their actions that are the most unrewarded and
often fruitless. In other words, nation states go about the business of protecting the
interests of nation states and military commanders often have no choice but to find
solutions for cooperation when political arrangements are lacking; otherwise, there is
the real danger of casualties. However, it is the international staff, those who work
with the interests of their respective institutions in mind, which experience the least
compensation for their efforts. This leads to fatigue, and given human nature, the
understandable pursuit of alternative areas in which one can see their efforts
rewarded in real policy outcomes.
To be sure, there have been concentrated efforts on behalf of nation-states to
overcome the political deadlock that hampers true EUNATO cooperation. One
example is the myriad of ‘non-papers’ that have circled within the permanent
representations of both the EU and NATO in the last few years.69 Yet, none of this
nation state diplomacy has managed to be successful to date. It would seem that for
countries like Cyprus and Turkey, there is a priority issue of national security and a
well-rounded functioning EUNATO strategic partnership that is ‘seamless or
complete’,70 is just subsidiary to these interests. Neither side appears willing to
negotiate unless solutions come in the form of a package deal; one that incorporates
a resolution to the Cyprus issue and Turkish EU membership. Furthermore, the
increased frustration to overcome this impasse emanating from states, experts,
international staff, and especially commanders in the field, has not yet reached a
crescendo that tips the balance in favour of this partnership. This leads to fatigue at
even the state level as best exemplified by the stilted NAC-PSC meetings and the
reduction of EUNATO cooperation on the agenda of the informal ‘Transatlantic
Events’.
Military personnel and especially the office of the DSACEUR have been
instrumental in ensuring that political obstacles do not get in the way of cooperation
on the ground. It has been helpful that those nation states that have been
obstructionist in Brussels have also been willing to turn a blind eye to cooperation
within common operational areas. But more significant is the common culture of
EUNATO military personnel. As mentioned above, the DSACEUR is ‘double-
hatted’ as the lead commander for EU-led operations, and all common EUNATO
member state CHODs are double-hatted in the EUMC, the NATOMC, as well as
most of the MILREPS. This leads to a common understanding, common expertise,
and the desire to get the job done on the ground. However, military personnel
recognise that when there are not agreements from the top-level down and
practitioners are forced to work with 14 separate MOUs or individual agreements
between IOs and nation-states, then this is all very time-consuming and there is
always a problem or disconnect in terms of information and intelligence sharing. In a
way, these commanders on the ground are fortunate that Kosovo is not extremely
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dangerous and that EUPOL is very modest in size, otherwise there would be a very
real danger of casualties resulting from these ad hoc arrangements.
As with the military personnel, both experts and international staff have done a
lot to circumvent political issues, while always working within their ‘redlines’. This
has its limits however. When always having to work within barriers that neglect the
political translation of work, it is bound to lead to institutional fatigue. Furthermore,
when political blockage restricts meetings at the highest levels, for instance between
MOFAs and MODs, it comes down to individual area-desks for exchanging
information with either an EU or NATO counterpart. In the end, this leads to
self-censorship and the rhythm of regular meetings will likely decrease if the
perception is such that they are getting nowhere.
Although EUNATO staff comments regarding the informal (and even formal)
institutional cooperation have ranged from ‘banalities’ to ‘welcomed cooperation’;
the truth is a mixture of both. If staffers merely exchange information and compare
notes, but these meetings are ‘chats only’, and if much of EUNATO business
between staff and experts remains unofficial, it will be impossible to have ‘concrete’
outcomes rewarded in official policy. In this situation, a feeling of disillusionment is
bound to set in.
Still another problem stems directly from the inability of NATO to pass classified
documents to the EU outside of matters regarding BiH. As a result, some EU staff
feel like cooperation is a one way street. Some have even gone so far as shutting down
their cooperation until this issue is resolved. Due to fatigue, the unofficial line in the
Commission is that they will not move until a grand bargain has been reached.71
As one staffer at NATO put it:
[I]n the end you are either cynical and you think that if cooperation is a real problem, a
solution has already been found. Or you are more realistic and you believe that the
situation is still workable, still acceptable, and until there are casualties due to this
disconnect, or a grand bargain is found, then people will work like this for weeks,
months, or years.72
Thoughts on the way forward
Although it is becoming a somewhat hackneyed expression, we are living in an age
where civilian and military instruments and capabilities go ‘hand in hand’ (Luciolli
2009). However, this does not make the statement any less true. Most commentators
and actors (even those actors not yet willing to see it go) agree that Berlin Plus is
outdated and a straitjacket. In this sense, EUNATO relations really are ‘stuck in the
1990s’. This final section comments on some recent proposals that have been put
forward to reconcile EUNATO differences and makes a number of recommenda-
tions of its own.
First, some have put forward the notion of a ‘Berlin Plus in Reverse’. This
concept is based on the premise that NATO would be willing to lead a civil crisis
mission utilising EU collective assets and capabilities. There are at least three
problems with this idea. First, a Berlin Plus in reverse would be hostage to the exact
same political setbacks as its military twin. Second, what this would really entail
would be a much more developed relationship between the Commission (who have
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the money) and NATO  which would be leading the operation. This is bound to
aggravate an already troublesome internal turf battle between the Commission and
the Council. Furthermore, there are those on both sides of the EUNATO divide
that do not want NATO participating in this type of mission as they see it as the sole
competence of the EU. Leading on from this, there is still, as yet, no consensus
within NATO to lead a civilian operation outside of the police training and security
sector reform missions that it currently performs.
Others have suggested that instead of only fixating on a top-down grand bargain
solution to EUNATO cooperational problems, the focus should be much more
bottom-up with an approach that envisions much more practical cooperation in the
field. The main drawback to this argument is that it is no different from the current
situation; it is the status quo. Although this is, in all likelihood, going to be the reality
for some time to come, it is susceptible to the problems of institutional fatigue
outlined above, especially at the level of staff to staff contacts. Therefore, a concerted
effort must be made to overcome potential lethargy in this area. A few proposals are
put forward.
First, there should be a concerted effort to hold more informal ‘transatlantic
events’ and especially to design a similar format for MODs and MILREPS. They
should be held with the understanding that EUNATO issues will be a key part of
the informal discussions. Second, Turkey must be invited to take part in individual
projects of the European Defence Agency (EDA) initially, but with a view to giving
them a full administrative arrangement in the near future. Furthermore, all non-EU
contributors to ESDP missions should be given full participation rights within the
Committees of Contributors for those operations in which they are engaged. Finally,
there should be a standard framework arrangement that underpins all cooperation in
the field between EU civil missions and NATO military missions and these issues
should be addressed in NATO’s new strategic concept to be finalised later this year.
These proposals are intermediary at best and are intended to help take the small
steps towards a medium bargain. David Yost (2007, pp. 9394) has correctly
suggested that there are really only three solutions for obtaining a ‘grand bargain’.
(1) Turkish membership in the EU, (2) the reunification of Cyprus, or (3) Cyprus
becoming a member of PfP and signing a security agreement with NATO. It is the
final option that is the most likely in the short- to medium-term. However, to achieve
this, a medium bargain should be negotiated that encompasses Cyprus becoming a
member of the PfP but balanced with Turkey’s administrative arrangements in the
EDA, and full participation rights (along with Canada) in the Committee of
Contributors for any mission in which they are currently engaged or plan to be in the
future. If need be, much of this could be worked out and agreed upon behind
the scenes if it were to help facilitate progress. Not only would this help ease the
deadlock of EUNATO cooperation, it would likely go a long way towards the
Turkish recognition of Nicosia that will have to necessitate any resolution of Cyprus
or future membership of Turkey in the EU.
Conclusion
This article has argued that it is the fixed positions of nation-states more than the
design of the EU and NATO as international organisations that prevent real
cooperation; that military actors, either in the field or in the centre, get the real
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business of EUNATO cooperation done especially when there are no fixed
agreements for cooperation; and contacts between staff as well as experts have
increased to try and ‘compensate but not substitute’ for the political deadlock.
However, there is a real concern that the lack of improvement in EUNATO
cooperation over such a sustained period of time will lead to institutional fatigue.
Although no level of actor  state, international staff, or military  is immune to
this difficulty, it has been argued here that the international staff is the most
vulnerable.
There seems to be increasing calls from all sectors to address this issue and to
look for various solutions to the problem. However, what is worrying is the lack of
movement within the organisations themselves. Both the frustration and the
solutions exist within EUNATO institutions and the policy think tanks that
surround them. Even those actors who have been the most obstructionist since 2003
have put forward non-paper policy solutions. However, the frustration does not yet
seem sufficient to substitute the informal arrangements for more formal ones and to
institutionalise those solutions that have been put forward to date. In other words, a
big enough external shock (the resolution of the Cyprus issue or, potentially, deaths
tragically occurring in the field that are attributable in some way to EUNATO
disconnect for example) has not yet transpired in order to change the current
arrangements. This ties into a further puzzle, one that the researcher is attempting to
answer elsewhere: why have sub-optimal arrangements continue to persist when they
would seem to be so detrimental to the major actors involved?
The real worry is that no grand bargain will be reached until there is a resolution
regarding Cyprus; one that encompasses all these issues in one package. For some it
would seem that nothing is negotiated until everything is negotiated. But for those in
the field depending on EUNATO cooperation for their personal security, this may
be too long of a wait. What is needed is a medium bargain that allows for
cooperation to advance without giving away the negotiation chips that certain actors
feel they must retain for future talks. What is clear, however, is that this will not
happen if too much attention and fanfare is a part of the process.
Notes
1. This article is based on a series of interviews conducted at the European Union Council
and Commission as well as at NATO HQ and SHAPE in January 2009 and February
2010. The interviews reflect all three levels of actors involved. The author would like to
thank all of those in the institutions who went well beyond the call of duty and gave up
very substantial amounts of time to provide a wealth of in-depth information.
2. Please see: European Union Council Cologne, 34 June 1999; European Council Helsinki,
1011 December; The Washington Declaration, 2324 April 1999.
3. As outlined in NATO-EU: a strategic partnership on the NATO website. Available from:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm
4. As outlined in EU-NATO: The framework for permanent relations on the ESDP website.
Available from: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-11%20Berlin%
20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf
5. Interview EU Commission, 12 February 2010.
6. Interview EU Council, 9 February 2010.
7. Interview NATO HQ, 11 February 2010.
8. For further background please see: Keohane (2006), Yost (2007) and Toje (2008).
9. See the NATO handbook. Available from: http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/pdf/
handbook.pdf
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10. See note 9 above.
11. For a more detailed description of ESDP institutional restructuring see: http://www.isis-
europe.org/pdf/2009_artrel_272_esr44-civmil-integration.pdf
12. See the NATO handbook, 239. Available 1from: http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/
pdf/handbook.pdf
13. See the NATO handbook, 242. Available from: http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/
pdf/handbook.pdf
14. The position of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) has always gone to an
American.
15. NATO website. Available from: http://www.nato.int/shape/about/structure.htm
16. See note 7 above.
17. For a more detailed description of ESDP military bodies see: http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id279&langen
18. Many mistakenly believe that this is an EUNATO integrated cell. It is more appropriate
to see this cell as the EU’s own Operational Headquarters (OHQ) facility to operate at the
strategic level, provided by NATO and within SHAPE as a bolt on but with access to full
NATO capability for a Berlin Plus operation. When Javier Solana went to visit this facility
for the first time, he was very clear that he was going to visit his (the EU’s) OHQ and not
SHAPE. There was a lot of emphasis within SHAPE to make sure that this was just not
cosmetic but a reality. The DSACEUR office was instrumental in this process.
19. Original agreements between the EU and NATO called for NAC-PSC meetings no less
than three times a semester (one Presidency).
20. Interview at NATO HQ, 10 February 2010.
21. Available from: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/chai57e.pdf
22. See note 20 above.
23. This referendum refers to a joint Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot vote aimed at
settling the Cyprus dispute. The referendum was rejected by the Greek-Cypriot side in
2004. The failure of this referendum came as a shock to many and has had major
implications for EUNATO relations as the Island joined the EU with this dispute
unresolved.
24. See note 20 above.
25. See note 20 above.
26. See note 6 above.
27. See note 6 above.
28. See note 20 above.
29. See note 7 above.
30. See note 6 above.
31. See note 5 above.
32. See note 5 above.
33. Interview with EEAS Official, 21 January 2011.
34. See note 5 above.
35. Note this position has changed to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy post-Lisbon Treaty December 2009.
36. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer key note speech: NATO and the EU: time for a new chapter.
Available from: http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2007/s070129b.html
37. See note 20 above.
38. See note 20 above.
39. See note 5 above.
40. See note 20 above.
41. See note 20 above.
42. See note 7 above.
43. As noted in section 7 of the EUNATO: the framework for permanent cooperation and
Berlin Plus. Available from: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-
11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf
44. NATO handbook, 2006. p. 146. Available from: http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/
db900sid/HMYT-6R8PNL/$file/nato-handbook-jun2006.pdf?openelement
45. Interview at NATO HQ, 9 February 2010.
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46. See note 5 above.
47. Interview NATO HQ, 26 March 2010.
48. Jamie Shea is Director of Policy Planning at NATO.
49. See note 46 above.
50. See note 5 above.
51. The alternative scenario (and the one Berlin Plus was designed for) would be a military
mission in which it was agreed that the EU would take the lead but utilise the
full spectrum of NATO collective assets in capabilities to execute the operation, for
example, potentially in Africa. To date no such scenario has transpired. The EU military
operation in the Congo (ARTEMIS) could have been conducted as a Berlin operation,
however, the EU decided to conduct this operation in complete autonomy from the
NATO.
52. The EU Council’s decision to launch operation CONCORDIA, 18 March 2003. Available
from: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Council%20Decision%
20launch%20of%20the%20EU%20Military%20Operation.pdf
53. See note 7 above.
54. For the ALTHEA fact sheet see: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/
missionPress/files/100121%20Factsheet%20EUFOR%20Althea%20-%20version%
2020_EN02.pdf
55. Interview at the Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU, 28 January 2009.
56. NATO website. Available from: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm
57. For the factsheet of this mission see: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/
docs/missionPress/files/100209%20FACTSHEET%20EULEX%20Kosovo%20-%
20version%2010_EN.pdf
58. Interview at NATO SHAPE, 11 February 2010.
59. Please see: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/10302092.asp
60. See note 7 and 5 above.
61. See note 56 above.
62. See note 20 above.
63. To view the EUPOL/Afghanistan factsheet, please see: http://www.consilium.europa.
eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/100218%20FACTSHEET%20EUPOL%20
Afghanistan%20-%20version%2017_EN.pdf
64. See note 7 above.
65. See note 46 above.
66. See note 5 above.
67. See note 20 above.
68. See note 46 above.
69. There have been ‘non-paper’ proposals at overcoming the impasse circulated by the five
Nordic countries, France, Greece, and Turkey in 2008/2009 alone. As yet none of these
solutions have been adopted.
70. Taken from Ahmet Davutoglu’s (Minister of Foreign Affairs for Turkey) paper: Bridging
an unnecessary divide: NATO and the EU. Available from: http://www.iss.europa.eu/
uploads/media/ISSues30_web.pdf
71. See note 5 above.
72. See note 20 above.
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